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NOTES
From the World Court to Oklahoma Court: The
Significance of Torres v. State for International Court of
Justice Authority, Individual Rights, and the Availability of
Remedy in Vienna Convention Disputes*
I. Introduction
In May 2004, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals issued an
unprecedented ruling with significant implications for the incorporation of
international law into Oklahoma law.1 In response to a decision of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ),2 the court stayed the execution of Osbaldo
Torres, a Mexican national on Oklahoma’s death row.3 The court remanded
Torres’s case for an evidentiary hearing because Torres, a Mexican national,
was denied his right to consular notification as required by Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention).4 As a result,
Torres appears to have become the first prisoner on death row in the United
States to avoid the death penalty on the basis of an ICJ decision.
The Vienna Convention mandates that U.S. officials do two things “without
delay” when foreign nationals are detained: (1) notify foreign nationals of their
right to notify their consulate and (2) if requested by foreign nationals, notify
the consulate of the detention.5 Torres v. State6 presented an issue of first
impression in Oklahoma,7 and indeed all U.S. state and federal courts, after the
ICJ’s decision in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals.8 In Avena, the ICJ held
that the United States had breached its Vienna Convention obligations to
* Winner, 2004-2005 Frank C. Love Memorial Award and 2004-2005 Gene and Jo Ann
Sharp Law Review Award for Outstanding Second Year Member. The author would like to
thank Professor Peter F. Krug for his encouragement and thoughtful suggestions throughout the
writing of this article.
1. Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (order granting stay
of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing).
2. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org.
3. Torres, No. PCD-04-442.
4. Id. at 2.
5. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, art. 36, 596
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
6. Torres, No. PCD-04-442.
7. Id. at 1 (Chapel, J., specially concurring).
8. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
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Mexico and fifty-one Mexican nationals who had been sentenced to death.9
As a result of the breach, the ICJ ordered U.S. courts to provide judicial
“review and reconsideration” of the convictions and sentences of these
Mexican nationals on the merits of their Vienna Convention claims, without
resort to procedural bar.10
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’s order to stay Torres’s execution
because his Vienna Convention rights were violated was unprecedented in
both Oklahoma and other U.S. state and federal courts.11 The ICJ had
previously addressed a Vienna Convention dispute between Germany and the
United States in LaGrand Case.12 There, the ICJ held, in almost identical
fashion to Avena, that where the United States was in breach of its Article 36
obligations, it must provide “review and reconsideration” of Vienna
Convention claims.13 U.S. state and federal courts, however, have “generally
ignored” this earlier mandate.14 One obstacle to “review and reconsideration”
of Vienna Convention claims is that U.S. courts have held that such claims
raised on appeal are procedurally barred if they were not previously raised at
trial court.15 Commentators and jurists have noted the inherent unfairness of
barring a claim based on a right not known to a defendant.16 In effect, this
procedural rule presents a “catch-22”17 by requiring a defendant to raise a
claim of which he is unaware when it is the state’s responsibility to inform him
of the right of consular notification.
Although the U.S. Department of State has increased its efforts to promote
awareness of Vienna Convention rights and obligations among state officials,18
9. Id. at 42-43, ¶ 106.
10. Id. at 53-54, ¶¶ 138-143.
11. Colter Paulson, Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice
Since 1987, 98 AM . J. INT’L L. 434, 446 (2004) (noting that only one federal decision has
provided “review and reconsideration” as intended by the ICJ in LaGrand Case (F.G.R. v.
U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-cij.org (referring to United States
ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Ill. 2002)).
12. LaGrand Case (F.G.R. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27), available at http://www.icjcij.org.
13. Id. at 40, ¶ 2; Paulson, supra note 11, at 445.
14. Paulson, supra note 11, at 445.
15. Id. at 444-46; Sarah M. Ray, Domesticating International Obligations: How to Ensure
U.S. Compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1729,
1753 (2003).
16. Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1036 (2003) (Stevens, J., op. respecting denial of pet.
for writ of cert.).
17. Jeffrey L. Green, Comment, International Law: Valdez v. State of Oklahoma and the
Application of International Law in Oklahoma, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 499, 500 (2003).
18. The Department of State has, for example, issued pocket cards and handbooks and
mailed periodic notices advising governors and attorneys general of Vienna Convention

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss2/4

2005]

NOTES

257

rights under the Vienna Convention are not well-known.19 Both the difficulty
of educating the large number of U.S. law enforcement officers20 and a
perception by state officials that notification of Vienna Convention rights is
not mandatory contribute to this lack of knowledge.21 As a result, officials
rarely provide notice of Vienna Convention rights to foreign detainees.22 This
lack of notice, combined with the U.S. practice of procedurally barring Vienna
Convention claims, has led to a “systematic failure” of the United States to
comply with Vienna Convention obligations.23
The Torres case gained national attention as it emerged due to the serious
conflicts it presented between international and domestic law.24 Critics of the
incorporation of international law into domestic proceedings questioned the
authority of the ICJ over U.S. domestic proceedings and discounted the merits
of Torres’s case.25 Oklahoma’s unprecedented decision in Torres garnered
national attention because of its legal basis and its dramatic conclusion.26
First, the decision signified compliance with an order from the ICJ — placing
the ICJ and international treaty rights over domestic procedural practice.27
This was an unexpected result, given that just six weeks earlier the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals had set an execution date for Torres without regard
to an ICJ provisional measure instructing the United States to stay Torres’s
execution pending the outcome of Avena.28 Second, the decision gained
further notoriety because, after years of appeals by Torres on various grounds,
obligations. William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of
Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 257, 274-75 (1998); Paulson, supra
note 11, at 444.
19. See John Quigley, LaGrand: A Challenge to the U.S. Judiciary, 27 YALE J. INT’L L.
435, 435 (2002).
20. Catherine Brown, Remarks: Consular Rights and the Death Penalty After LaGrand, 96
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 309, 313 (2003).
21. Aceves, supra note 18, at 275.
22. Id.
23. Note, Too Sovereign but Not Sovereign Enough: Are U.S. States Beyond the Reach of
the Law of Nations?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2654, 2654 (2003) [hereinafter Too Sovereign but Not
Sovereign Enough].
24. Jess Bravin, U.S. Is Found to Violate Treaty in Handling Mexican Prisoners, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 1, 2004; Adam Liptak, Mexico Awaits Hague Ruling on Citizens on Death Row, N. Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, at A1.
25. Eric Posner & John C. Yoo, International Court of Hubris, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2004,
at A18; William F. Buckley, Jr., Enter the Hague, NAT’L REV., Mar. 8, 2004, at 58.
26. Adam Liptak, Execution of Mexican Is Halted, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2004, at A23;
James H. Carter, Avena in an Oklahoma Court, Notes from ASIL President James H. Carter,
American Society of International Law, at http://www.asil.org/inthenews/avena.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2005).
27. Carter, supra note 26.
28. Jess Bravin, State to Execute Mexican Prisoner, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2004, at A12.
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the judicial order was announced just five days before Torres’s scheduled
execution.29 Finally, the order coincided with the Oklahoma Pardon and
Parole Board’s recommendation to stay Torres’s execution and Oklahoma
Governor Brad Henry’s grant of clemency, signaling a united approach from
governmental officials and the state judiciary to a Vienna Convention claim.30
The Torres case presents complex and controversial issues involving the
incorporation of U.S. international treaty obligations into domestic law by U.S.
state and federal courts. This note explores the significance of Torres in the
context of competing judicial approaches to Vienna Convention claims. The
note concludes that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’s decision rested
on findings that: (1) the ICJ’s authority extends to Oklahoma proceedings; (2)
the Vienna Convention grants individually enforceable rights; and (3) a
remedy is available for Vienna Convention violations. While already
significant when the Torres decision was announced, these conclusions may
take on greater relevance to other state court proceedings as a result of
President George W. Bush’s February 28, 2005 memorandum indicating that
all U.S. states will “give effect” to the ICJ’s directive in Avena in state court
proceedings involving the fifty-one Mexican nationals named in Avena.31
President Bush’s memorandum notwithstanding, this note further considers
other unsettled issues of Vienna Convention jurisprudence that may lead U.S.
federal and state courts to reach a result contrary to Torres.
Part II introduces the rights and obligations established by the Vienna
Convention and the role of the ICJ in interpreting and resolving disputes
arising under the Vienna Convention. Part II also traces the recent history of
Vienna Convention claims in the United States, reviewing those that lead
directly to the Torres decision and highlighting the contentious interplay
between decisions of the ICJ and U.S. federal and state courts since 1998. Part
III describes the factual background of Torres’s Vienna Convention claim, the
issues presented before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and the
decision rendered in Torres. Part III also discusses the Torres order and the
fundamental disagreement between the special concurring opinion and the
dissenting opinion regarding the authority of the ICJ’s decision in Avena. Part
IV analyzes the complex issues raised by the Torres decision and examines the
29. Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (order granting stay
of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing).
30. Press Release, Office of Governor Brad Henry, State of Oklahoma, Gov. Henry Grants
Clemency to Death Row Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004), at http://www.governor.state.ok.us/
display_article.php?article_id=301&article_type=1 [hereinafter Gov. Henry Press Release].
31. George W. Bush, U.S. President, Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb. 28,
2005), available at http://www.asil.org/inthenews/avenamemo050308.html [hereinafter
Memorandum for the Attorney General].
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implicit legal conclusions upon which the Torres decision relies, signifying the
incorporation of international law into Oklahoma law. Part V discusses the
future of Vienna Convention claims in the United States and explores the
doctrinal barriers to Torres’s precedential value in Oklahoma and other state
and federal courts. Part V also addresses developments in the treatment of the
Vienna Convention in the United States since Torres was decided32 and the
unsettled legal issues that will likely determine whether relief is granted in
future Vienna Convention claims.
II. Development of the Law Before Torres
A. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
A leading scholar has described the Vienna Convention as “undoubtedly the
single most important event in the entire history of the consular institution.”33
The Vienna Convention is a multinational treaty codifying consular rights and
obligations between state parties.34 According to the Vienna Convention,
sending states may establish consular posts in a receiving state with that state’s
consent.35 The Vienna Convention defines a variety of political, economic,
and sociocultural functions of consular posts, including: (1) protecting the
interests of the sending state and its nationals; (2) promoting relations between
the sending and receiving states; and (3) assisting nationals of the sending
state, including representing nationals before tribunals.36 Over ninety
countries, including the United States, participated in the drafting of the
Vienna Convention.37 The United States signed the Vienna Convention in

32. Three significant events occurred after Torres was decided. First, President George W.
Bush issued a memorandum to the U.S. Attorney General on February 28, 2005 indicating that
the United States will comply with its Vienna Convention obligations by having state courts
“give effect” to the ICJ’s decision in Avena. Memorandum for the Attorney General, supra note
31. Only a week later, on March 7, 2005, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice notified the
U.N. Secretary-General that the United States was withdrawing from the Optional Protocol
granting jurisdiction to the ICJ in matters concerning the Vienna Convention. Frederic L.
Kirgis, Addendum to ASIL Insight, President Bush’s Determination Regarding Mexican
Nationals and Consular Convention Rights (Mar. 2005), at http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/
03/insights050309a.html [hereinafter Kirgis, Addendum]. Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court
dismissed as improvidently granted a writ granted to provide habeas review of a case involving
a Mexican national named in Avena in order to allow state court proceedings consistent with
President Bush’s memorandum. Medellín v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005) (per curiam).
33. LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 27 (2d ed. 1991).
34. Vienna Convention, supra note 5.
35. Id. art. 4.
36. Id. art. 5.
37. Aceves, supra note 18, at 263 (citing LEE, supra note 33, at 27).
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1963 and ratified it in 1969.38 The U.S. Secretary of State, William P. Rogers,
urged ratification of the Vienna Convention in a letter to President Nixon,
writing that “it constitutes an important contribution to the development and
codification of international law and should contribute to the orderly and
effective conduct of consular relations between States.”39
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention describes the obligations of state
parties that detain foreign nationals, as well as the rights of detained foreign
nationals and their home states.40 In particular, paragraph 1 of Article 36 notes
that state parties have the obligation to inform detained foreign nationals
“without delay” of their right to notify their consulate.41 Then, if requested by
foreign nationals, the state must notify the foreign consulate of their
detention.42 Paragraph 1 also provides that consular officials have the right to
communicate with, visit, and arrange for the legal representation of a detained
national.43 Paragraph 2 explains how the rights in paragraph 1 are to be carried
out, and provides that the rights of communication between detainees and their
consulate “shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of
the receiving State.”44 Despite this deference to state mechanisms for
implementation, paragraph 2 further provides that this deference is “subject to
the proviso” that such laws and regulations “must enable full effect to be given
to the purposes for which the rights accorded . . . are intended.”45
Article 36 serves two purposes. First, it protects the interests of both
foreign nationals and state parties.46 Second, it gives each the right of free
access and communication with the other.47 Article 36 enables foreign
countries to monitor and protect their nationals when detained abroad,48 and
as a practical matter allows consular officials to provide important assistance
to detainees who face obstacles such as language difficulties and unfamiliar
38. Id. at 268-69.
39. Letter from William P. Rogers, U.S. Secretary of State, to Richard Nixon, U.S.
President, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 803, 806 (1969).
40. Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 36.
41. Id.
42. Id. art. 36, ¶ 1b states:
If [the foreign national] so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall,
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular
district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending
trial or is detained in any other manner . . . [t]he said authorities shall inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights . . . .
43. Id. art. 36, ¶ 1c.
44. Id. art. 36, ¶ 2.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Aceves, supra note 18, at 259.
47. Id.
48. LEE, supra note 33, at 15.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss2/4

2005]

NOTES

261

legal procedures within a foreign criminal justice system.49 Consular officials
may provide or acquire legal assistance, explain criminal proceedings, and
provide witnesses or evidence from a foreign national’s home state.50 Such
assistance may be particularly important in the penalty phase of capital
proceedings, where information about the defendant’s background may serve
as a mitigating factor to prevent a death sentence.51 Consular officials may
also research and provide information about the social, mental, and health
background of a defendant from the home state that court-appointed defense
attorneys may not have the time or budget to acquire.52
B. Resolving Disputes Arising Under the Vienna Convention: The
International Court of Justice
The ICJ is the judicial forum for resolving Vienna Convention disputes.53
The Vienna Convention itself is silent on how to resolve disputes arising
under the treaty. A separate Optional Protocol, however, accompanies the
Vienna Convention and allocates jurisdiction to the ICJ to resolve Vienna
Convention issues and enforce treaty provisions.54 The ICJ55 was created by
the United Nations Charter to serve as “the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations.”56 The ICJ Statute delineates the court’s jurisdiction.57 The
court can only hear cases where the parties before it are states58 that are party
to the ICJ Statute.59 All U.N. members are automatically party to the ICJ
Statute.60 Furthermore, ICJ jurisdiction only extends to cases as provided for
in the U.N. Charter or treaties in force, or where a party has declared its
consent to prospective compulsory jurisdiction.61
Accordingly, the
jurisdiction of the ICJ is only by state consent, which may be granted by the
49. Ray, supra note 15, at 1736.
50. Quigley, supra note 19, at 435.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, art. I, 596 U.N.T.S. 487
[hereinafter Optional Protocol].
54. Id.
55. The ICJ is sometimes referred to as the “World Court.” See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE
WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS (4th ed. 1989) [hereinafter ROSENNE, THE
WORLD COURT].
56. U.N. CHARTER art. 92 [hereinafter U.N. CHARTER].
57. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 (June 26, 1945)
[hereinafter ICJ Statute].
58. Id. art. 34.
59. Id. art. 35.
60. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 56, art. 93.1.
61. ICJ Statute, supra note 57, art. 36.
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state on (1) an ad hoc basis, (2) through operation of a jurisdictional grant in
a treaty to which a state is party, or (3) by a state’s voluntary consent to
prospective compulsory jurisdiction.62 The principle of consent to jurisdiction
is significant because states that consent to jurisdiction are more likely to
comply with ICJ decisions.63 The United States ratified the Vienna
Convention together with its Optional Protocol in 1969.64 In 2005, the United
States withdrew from the Optional Protocol granting jurisdiction to the ICJ.65
Because the United States had consented to ICJ jurisdiction over Vienna
Convention disputes, however, it is bound by ICJ decisions in cases where it
was a party between 1969 and 2005.
The ICJ Statute further provides that judgments of the ICJ are final and are
only binding between the parties and with respect to the case before the
court.66 The U.N. Charter reinforces the binding nature of ICJ opinions by
requiring that all U.N. members “undertake[] to comply with the decision of
the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.”67 The ICJ
also has the power to issue “any provisional measures which ought to be taken
to preserve the respective rights of either party.”68 Under the powers provided
by the ICJ Statute, the ICJ has issued both provisional measures and final
judgments regarding obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.69
C. Litigation on the Issue of Consular Notification Before Torres
The extent of the United States’s obligations under the Vienna Convention
has been a hotly litigated topic in U.S. and international courts since 1998,
with conflicting results. The 1998 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Breard v.
Greene70 limited the force of ICJ provisional measures within the United
States and the legal recourse available to foreign nationals who claim that
detaining officials have violated their Vienna Convention rights.71 On an
international level, since 1998, the ICJ has considered three cases involving
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 903,
cmt. a (1987).
63. ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT, supra note 55, at 44.
64. LUKE T. LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS 204 (1966).
65. Kirgis, Addendum, supra note 32. Professor Kirgis notes that the United States issued
its withdrawal on March 7, 2005, but that the effective date of the withdrawal is uncertain. Id.
If challenged, the withdrawal may not be effective immediately, but after “reasonable notice.”
Id.
66. ICJ Statute, supra note 57, arts. 59-60.
67. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 56, art 94.1.
68. Id. art. 41.1.
69. See infra Part II.C.
70. 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam).
71. Id. at 372-73.
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U.S. obligations under the Vienna Convention;72 of those cases, the ICJ has
issued two decisions on the merits of a Vienna Convention claim.73 In the first
decision, LaGrand Case,74 the ICJ challenged the Breard decision and
affirmed a wider set of obligations under the Vienna Convention than those
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court.75 In Valdez v. State,76 however, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals considered and rejected the ICJ’s
holding in LaGrand and ruled according to Breard.77 The ICJ revisited U.S.
obligations under the Vienna Convention for the second time in Avena and
clarified its holding in LaGrand that the United States must give judicial effect
to the treaty and account for Vienna Convention violations.78 The Torres case
emerged on the heels of Avena and in the context of these conflicting
viewpoints.
1. Breard v. Greene
Angel Breard, a citizen of Paraguay, was convicted of attempted rape and
murder and was sentenced to death by a Virginia trial court.79 Both state and
federal courts confirmed his conviction.80 Subsequently, Breard filed a motion
for habeas relief in federal court, seeking to overturn his conviction and death
penalty sentence. In his motion, Breard argued for the first time that Virginia
officials had not informed him during his arrest of his right under the Vienna
Convention to notify his consulate.81 After Breard filed his motion, Paraguay
brought suit against Virginia officials in federal district court on the ground
that its own rights had been violated by Virginia’s failure to notify Breard of
his rights under the Vienna Convention.82 Both the district court and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit barred Paraguay’s claim on Eleventh
Amendment grounds. Subsequently, Paraguay simultaneously appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court and filed suit against the United States in the ICJ,
asserting that, by failing to notify Breard of his consular rights, the United
72. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org; LaGrand Case (F.G.R. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.),
1998 I.C.J. No. 99 (Apr. 9), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
73. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128; LaGrand Case, 2001 I.C.J. 104.
74. 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
75. Id.
76. 2002 OK CR 20, 46 P.3d 703.
77. Id. ¶ 6, 46 P.3d at 705.
78. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128.
79. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1998) (per curiam).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1272-73 (E.D. Va. 1996).
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States was in breach of the Vienna Convention.83 Before hearing the case, the
ICJ issued a provisional measure requesting that the United States stay
Breard’s execution pending the ICJ’s final decision on the matter.84 Armed
with the ICJ’s measure, Paraguay then filed a motion with the U.S. Supreme
Court to halt Breard’s execution.85
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the three separate claims of Breard and
Paraguay in one decision, released just hours before Breard’s scheduled
execution.86 The Court affirmed the dismissal of Paraguay’s case against
Virginia on the grounds that: (1) the Vienna Convention does not “clearly
provide” a foreign state with a private right of action in U.S. courts to set aside
criminal convictions and sentences, and (2) the Eleventh Amendment
prohibits suits by foreign states against a domestic state of the United States.87
Regarding the enforcement of the ICJ’s provisional measure, the U.S.
Supreme Court wrote that “it has been recognized in international law that,
absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the
forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that State.”88 The
Court also noted that the Vienna Convention itself adopts this proposition in
paragraph 2 of Article 36.89 On this basis, the Court held that, because Breard
had not raised his Vienna Convention claim in state court proceedings, he had
not preserved the claim for federal habeas review and U.S. procedural rules
barred him from asserting a Vienna Convention claim.90
The Court also invoked the “later-in-time” rule to support its assertion that
Breard was procedurally precluded from raising his Vienna Convention claim.
The Court noted that, while treaties are the “supreme Law of the Land” under
the U.S. Constitution,91 an act of Congress is equal in status to a treaty. Thus,
where a statute conflicts with a treaty, under the “later-in-time” doctrine, that
which is enacted “subsequent in time” controls.92 The Court cited the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,93 enacted in 1996, as

83. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 99 (Apr. 9),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
84. Id. ¶ 41 (“The United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel
Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings.”).
85. Breard, 523 U.S. at 374-75.
86. Id. at 372-73.
87. Id. at 377-78.
88. Id. at 375.
89. Id.; see supra Part II.A.
90. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375-76.
91. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
92. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
93. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), (e)(2) (2000).
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superceding the Vienna Convention.94 The Act provides that the factual basis
for violations of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States must
be asserted in state court proceedings to be heard on habeas review.95
Accordingly, because Breard had not asserted the violation of his Vienna
Convention rights in state court proceedings, the subsequently enacted
procedural rule superseded any rights granted by the Vienna Convention and
prevented him from asserting those rights before the Court.96 After Virginia
executed Breard, Paraguay withdrew its claim against the United States from
the ICJ.97
2. LaGrand Case
Three years later, the ICJ heard LaGrand,98 a Vienna Convention claim
filed by Germany against the United States. Karl and Walter LaGrand,
German nationals, were convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death in Arizona.99 Arizona officials did not inform either of the brothers of
his right to consular notification until after conviction, sentencing, and several
appeals. Likewise, officials failed to notify Germany of the arrest of the
LaGrand brothers.100 Accordingly, the LaGrands did not raise their Vienna
Convention claim at trial or in state court postconviction proceedings.101 As
in Breard, when the brothers raised their Vienna Convention claims in federal
habeas review, the court found that their claims were procedurally barred
because those claims had not been raised previously in state proceedings.102
Germany pursued diplomatic channels to halt the executions of the LaGrand
brothers, but Karl LaGrand was executed nonetheless.103 The day before
Walter LaGrand was scheduled to be executed, Germany filed a claim against
the United States in the ICJ alleging a violation of the Vienna Convention and
requesting a provisional measure against the United States to stay the
execution.104 The ICJ issued a provisional measure requesting that the United

94. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 99 (Apr. 9),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
98. LaGrand Case (F.G.R. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27), available at http://www.icjcij.org.
99. Id. ¶ 14.
100. Id. ¶¶ 15, 19-21.
101. See id. ¶¶ 19-21.
102. LaGrand v. Stewart, 170 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 1999).
103. LaGrand Case, 2001 I.C.J. at 12, ¶ 26.
104. Id. at 12-13, ¶ 30.
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States suspend the execution pending the final judgment of the ICJ,105 but
Arizona carried out the execution that same day.106
Unlike Paraguay in its case before the ICJ concerning Angel Breard,
Germany did not withdraw its claim from the ICJ after Arizona executed the
LaGrands.107 Therefore, LaGrand was the first opportunity for the ICJ to rule
on the merits of a Vienna Convention claim against the United States. The
court issued significant holdings in favor of Vienna Convention claimants.
First, in response to the execution of Walter LaGrand despite the ICJ
provisional measure, the ICJ announced for the first time that its provisional
measures are binding and that the United States had violated the measure.108
Second, the ICJ found that, by failing to inform the LaGrand brothers of their
right to notify their consulate and Germany of the brothers’ arrest, the United
States had violated Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention.109
Germany also challenged the procedural default rule used to prevent the
LaGrands from having their claims heard in U.S. federal and state courts.110
The ICJ held that barring a Vienna Convention claim by invoking the
procedural default rule frustrated the purpose of the Vienna Convention and
thereby violated paragraph 2 of Article 36.111 Paragraph 2 indicates that the
rights of communication between detainees and their consulate “shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State,
subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable
full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded . . . are
intended.”112 Because Arizona had already executed the LaGrand brothers, the
ICJ ordered a future remedy for instances where U.S. officials failed to afford
German nationals their Vienna Convention rights and subsequently sentenced
them to severe penalties.113 The ICJ indicated that the United States, “by
means of its own choosing, shall allow the review and reconsideration of the
conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set
forth” in the Vienna Convention.114
105. Id. at 13, ¶ 32.
106. Id. at 13, ¶ 34.
107. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 99 (Apr. 9),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
108. LaGrand Case, 2001 I.C.J. at 28-30, ¶¶ 98-104.
109. Id. at 21-22, ¶ 73.
110. Id. at 25-26, ¶¶ 79-83.
111. Id. ¶ 91 (“[T]he procedural default rule had the effect of preventing ‘full effect [from
being] given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are intended.’”
(quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 36, ¶ 2)).
112. Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 36, ¶ 2 (emphasis added).
113. LaGrand Case, 2001 I.C.J. at 40, ¶ 128(7).
114. Id.
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3. Valdez v. State
After the ICJ’s decision in LaGrand, Valdez v. State115 was one of the first
cases to come before a state court seeking relief for a Vienna Convention
violation.116 Valdez presented the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals with
the question of whether the court was required to follow LaGrand in its own
proceedings.117 Gerardo Valdez Maltos, a Mexican national, was convicted
and sentenced to death in Oklahoma for murder.118 Oklahoma officials did not
inform Valdez of his right to notify his consulate or Mexico of Valdez’s
detention until after he had exhausted his appeals and was scheduled to be
executed.119 Mexican consular officials assisted Valdez in his clemency
hearing before Oklahoma’s Pardon and Parole Board, obtaining new evidence
from sources in Mexico about his background and medical history, including
evidence of severe organic brain damage.120 Oklahoma’s Pardon and Parole
Board subsequently recommended that Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating
commute Valdez’s sentence to life in prison.121 Governor Keating, however,
denied clemency on the ground that the violation of the Vienna Convention
did not cause prejudice.122 Valdez then appealed his death penalty sentence
to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing that Oklahoma must
follow the ICJ’s remedy of “review and reconsideration” as articulated in
LaGrand.123 Valdez further argued that, even if the court applied Oklahoma’s
statutory procedural default rule,124 the court could hear his claim under an
exception to that rule because LaGrand provided a legal basis for relief that
was previously unavailable.125
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that, under the strict
requirements of Oklahoma’s Capital Post-Conviction Procedure Act,126 Valdez
must show that the new legal basis for his claim was previously unavailable.127
The court found that, because Valdez’s legal claim was available at the time
of his trial by virtue of the existence of the treaty, he could have advanced his
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

2002 OK CR 20, 46 P.3d 703.
Green, supra note 17, at 499.
Valdez, ¶ 16, 46 P.3d at 707.
Id. ¶ 1, 46 P.3d at 704.
Id. ¶ 6, 46 P.3d at 705.
Id. ¶ 7, 46 P.3d at 706.
Id. ¶ 9, 46 P.3d at 706.
Id.
Id. ¶ 10, 46 P.3d at 706.
See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089 (2001).
Valdez, ¶ 10, 46 P.3d at 706.
22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089.
Valdez, ¶ 19, 46 P.3d at 708-09.
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claim before the ICJ’s LaGrand decision.128 Therefore, the Act barred his
Vienna Convention claim.129 The court also held that, notwithstanding the
ICJ’s decision, the Supreme Court’s Breard decision remained controlling
over the issue, writing that “[f]or this Court to decide the ICJ’s ruling
overrules a binding decision of the United States Supreme Court and affords
a judicial remedy to an individual for a violation of the Convention would
interfere with the nation’s foreign affairs and run afoul of the U.S.
Constitution.”130 While the court rejected Valdez’s Vienna Convention claim,
it did provide relief on other grounds. The court waived Oklahoma’s
procedural default rule based on new factual evidence of Valdez’s medical
history and remanded the case for resentencing because of ineffective
assistance of counsel in obtaining the evidence of Valdez’s social, mental, and
medical history from Mexico.131
4. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
Just two years after LaGrand, the ICJ again addressed the obligations of the
United States under the Vienna Convention in Avena.132 In Avena, Mexico
filed proceedings against the United States in the ICJ on behalf of fifty-four
Mexican nationals sentenced to death in nine states, claiming breach of the
Vienna Convention’s obligation of notification.133 Mexico also argued that the
United States’ use of the procedural default rule deferred “review and
reconsideration” to clemency hearings,134 and as a result, denied rights
guaranteed under the Vienna Convention by precluding “meaningful and
effective review and reconsideration” of Vienna Convention violations as
required by LaGrand.135 The ICJ held that the United States was in breach of
the Vienna Convention because it had violated its obligation to notify fiftyone136 of the detained Mexican nationals of their right to consular notification
and to inform Mexico of the detentions.137 Furthermore, by virtue of those
breaches, the ICJ held that the United States had violated its obligation to
128. Id. ¶ 21, 46 P.3d at 709.
129. Id.
130. Id. ¶ 23, 46 P.3d at 709.
131. Id. ¶¶ 24-28, 46 P.3d at 709-10.
132. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
133. Id. at 7, ¶ 15.
134. Id. at 52, ¶ 135 (arguing that “clemency review is standardless, secretive, and immune
from judicial oversight”).
135. Id. at 14, ¶ 14.
136. Although Mexico named fifty-four Mexican nationals in its suit, the ICJ’s decision
reached only fifty-one of those nationals. Id. at 42-43, ¶ 106.
137. Id. at 43, ¶ 106.
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allow Mexico to access, communicate with, and provide for the legal
representation of its citizens.138
As remedy for the breach, the ICJ reaffirmed its directive in LaGrand that
sentences and convictions be reviewed and reconsidered to account for Vienna
Convention violations. The ICJ qualified the LaGrand holding, however, that
such review and reconsideration by the United States could be done “by
means of its own choosing.”139 The ICJ held in Avena that the use of the
procedural default rule “effectively bar[s]” defendants from having their
Article 36 claims heard,140 and that “it is the judicial process that is suited to
this task.”141 The court concluded that clemency review did not provide
sufficient review and reconsideration of Vienna Convention claims; therefore,
the procedural default rule could not be used to prevent the hearing of Vienna
Convention claims in court.142 Because three of the Mexican nationals named
in the suit had exhausted their judicial opportunities for appeal and were
procedurally barred from raising their Vienna Convention claims, the court
found the United States in breach of the Article 36, paragraph 2 requirement
that the laws and regulations of the forum state must give full effect to the
rights given in Article 36.143 Finally, the court extended these holdings
beyond the parties before it to “other foreign nationals finding themselves in
similar situations in the United States.”144
III. Torres v. State
A. Procedural History
Osbaldo Torres, a Mexican national, was convicted in Oklahoma of two
counts of first-degree murder committed in 1993, for which he received death
sentences.145 Torres’s convictions were affirmed in state appeals and federal
habeas review.146 In 1999, Torres raised a claim for breach of his Vienna
Convention rights for the first time in federal habeas review.147 The district
138. Id.
139. See id. at 53-54, ¶¶ 140-143, 153.
140. Id. at 52, ¶ 134.
141. Id. at 54, ¶ 140.
142. Id. at 54, ¶¶ 141-143.
143. Id. at 58, ¶ 152. Cesar Roberto Fierro Reyna, Roberto Moreno Ramos, and Osbaldo
Torres Aguilera were the three Mexican nationals who had exhausted their appeals. Id.
144. Id. at 57, ¶ 151.
145. Torres v. State, 2002 OK CR 35, ¶ 1, 58 P.3d 214, 215.
146. Id.
147. Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1038 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referring to
Torres v. Gibson, No. CIV-99-155-R, at 73 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 23, 2000) (unpublished mem. op.
and order)).
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court rejected Torres’s claim based on the procedural default rule articulated
in Breard because Torres had not previously raised his claim in state
proceedings, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.148
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on November 17, 2003.149 In his
dissent, Justice Breyer stated that he would “defer consideration” of the
petition, given the substantiality of Torres’s arguments, the lack of briefs from
the United States and international experts, the pending Avena case before the
ICJ, and the international implications of the issues involved.150 Justice
Stevens also issued an opinion regarding the denial of certiorari.151 He
characterized Breard’s application of the procedural default rule to Article 36
claims as “not only in direct violation of the Vienna Convention, but . . .
manifestly unfair” in that “a foreign national who is presumptively ignorant
of his right to notification should not be deemed to have waived his Article 36
protections.”152 Noting the obligations of states under the Supremacy Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, Justice Stevens concluded that “[t]he Court is . . .
unfaithful to that command when it permits state courts to disregard the
Nation’s treaty obligations.”153
Torres was one of the Mexican nationals specifically named by Mexico in
the Avena case filed at the ICJ. Torres was also named in an ICJ provisional
measure released before Avena that requested that the United States “take all
measures necessary to ensure that [the three Mexican nationals] are not
executed pending final judgment on these proceedings.”154 The ICJ noted that
this provisional measure was necessary, given that Torres and two other
Mexican nationals were at risk of execution within the following weeks or
months.155 Despite the provisional measure, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals scheduled Torres’s execution date for May 18, 2004.156
After the ICJ announced its decision in Avena, and just six weeks before his
scheduled execution, Torres filed a Subsequent Application for PostConviction Relief with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.157 In Avena,
in addition to finding that the United States had violated Torres’s Vienna
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1035.
150. Id. at 1041 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1035 (Stevens, J., op. respecting denial of pet. for writ of cert.).
152. Id. at 1036 (Stevens, J., op. respecting denial of pet. for writ of cert.).
153. Id. at 1037 (Stevens, J., op. respecting denial of pet. for writ of cert.).
154. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 128, ¶ 59 (Provisional
Measures Order Feb. 5), available at http://www.icj-cij/org.
155. Id. at 14, ¶ 55.
156. Bravin, supra note 28.
157. Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (order granting stay
of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss2/4

2005]

NOTES

271

Convention rights, the ICJ also noted that the United States was in breach of
the “review and reconsideration” requirement of Article 36, paragraph 2 with
regard to Torres. Therefore, the ICJ ordered the United States “to find an
appropriate remedy having the nature of review and reconsideration according
to the criteria indicated.”158 These criteria precluded resort to the clemency
process alone and required judicial review to guarantee “that full weight is
given to the violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention.”159
In the context of the conflicting directives from Breard, LaGrand, Valdez,
and Avena regarding the application of the procedural default rule to Article
36 claims, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals faced several significant
issues. First, the court had to determine whether, in light of Avena, the
substantive rights granted by the Vienna Convention trumped domestic
procedural rules or whether procedure superseded Vienna Convention rights
as the court had previously held in Valdez.160 The court also had to determine
whether the ICJ’s decisions were binding on Oklahoma courts, whether the
Vienna Convention granted an individual right to enforce Vienna Convention
obligations, and whether any remedy was available for Vienna Convention
violations.
B. The Torres Order
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals responded to Torres’s request for
relief just five days before his scheduled execution.161 The court issued an
order that stayed Torres’s execution indefinitely and remanded his case for an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Torres was prejudiced by the State’s
violation of his Vienna Convention rights and ineffective assistance of
counsel.162 On the same day, Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry also granted
clemency to Torres and commuted his sentence to life in prison without the
possibility of parole, noting the violation of Torres’s Vienna Convention
rights and the binding nature of the ICJ’s Avena decision.163 Governor Henry
further cited the role that the U.S. State Department had played in urging him
to give “careful consideration” to the treaty.164 He added that, despite the
decision by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, he “felt it important to
announce the decision that [he] had made upon a careful and thorough review

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128 at 58, ¶ 152.
Id. at 53, ¶ 139.
Valdez v. State, 2002 OK CR 20, ¶ 21, 46 P.3d 703, 709.
Torres, No. PCD-04-442.
Id. at 2.
Gov. Henry Press Release, supra note 30.
Id.
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of the entire case.”165 Governor Henry’s decision followed a three-to-two
recommendation of clemency by the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board,
which had also considered the Vienna Convention breach in its
deliberations.166
C. Discussion of the Torres Order
The order from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to stay Torres’s
execution and remand his case for a hearing is a sparse one. The only
reference to Torres’s Vienna Convention claim is in the directive that the case
be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on “(a) whether Torres was prejudiced
by the State’s violation of his Vienna Convention rights in failing to inform
Torres, after he was detained, that he had the right to contact the Mexican
consulate; and (b) ineffective assistance of counsel.”167
Judge Chapel’s special concurrence to the order addresses some of the
issues involving the application of international law in Oklahoma that the
order did not address.168 First, Judge Chapel distinguished the situation
presented in Torres from that presented two years earlier in Valdez, where the
court barred the Vienna Convention claim on procedural grounds.169 Judge
Chapel noted that Valdez, a Mexican national, based his Vienna Convention
claim on the ICJ’s LaGrand decision, which involved Germany and German
nationals rather than Mexico or Mexican nationals.170 Consequently, Valdez
could not invoke LaGrand as legal authority for his case. In contrast, because
Avena specifically named Torres and his government was party to the ICJ
claim, Torres could invoke Avena.171 This result is arguably consistent with
Article 59 of the ICJ Statute, which indicates that decisions of the ICJ are
binding only between those parties and the case before it.172
Judge Chapel found that “[t]here is no question that this Court is bound by
the Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol.”173 Judge Chapel traced the
165. Id.
166. Id.; Julie E. Bisbie, Okla. Panel Backs Clemency for Mexican Inmate – State Feels Heat
of Court Ruling, COM. APPEAL, May 8, 2004.
167. Torres, No. PCD-04-442, at 2.
168. Id. at 1 (Chapel, J., specially concurring).
169. Id. at 1 n.1 (Chapel, J., specially concurring).
170. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27), available at http://www.icjcij.org.
171. Torres, No. PCD-04-442, at 1 n.1 (Chapel, J., specially concurring) (“In Valdez, the
petitioner attempted to rely on an International Court of Justice case to which neither he nor his
complaining government were party, and which did not specifically discuss his Vienna
Convention claims.”).
172. ICJ Statute, supra note 57, art. 59.
173. Torres, No. PCD-04-442, at 3 (Chapel, J., specially concurring).
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ICJ’s authority in U.S. domestic law through the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.174 He reasoned that the Vienna Convention applied to
Oklahoma because, as the federal government has the authority to make a
treaty, “[e]very state or federal court . . . has agreed that it is binding on all
jurisdictions within the United States.”175 Accordingly, the issue of whether
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was obliged to follow the ICJ’s
decision in Avena was “not [the court’s] to determine.”176 Judge Chapel
concluded that, because the court was bound by the Vienna Convention and
Optional Protocol, the court must give full faith and credit to the ICJ’s
decision in Avena and provide review and reconsideration.177
Judge Lumpkin’s dissent, in which Judge Lile joined, is in stark contrast to
Judge Chapel’s concurrence. Judge Lumpkin found that Avena was not
binding on the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.178 Consequently, as in
Valdez, Judge Lumpkin would have required Torres’s claims to meet the
requirements of Oklahoma’s Post-Conviction Procedure Act, which specifies
that to be heard on appeal, claims must be grounded in facts or legal claims
that could not have been previously presented because they were
unavailable.179 Presumably, because Judge Lumpkin considered the ICJ
opinion not binding on the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the Avena
decision did not operate as a new legal basis for remedy according to
Oklahoma’s Post-Conviction Procedure Act.180 Accordingly, Judge Lumpkin
found Torres’s Vienna Convention claim waived because the legal basis for
the claim was available since 1993 and Torres had never previously raised the
claim.181 He would have also barred the appeal on the basis of ineffective
assistance of counsel because the claim was raised and adjudicated in an
earlier direct appeal and in federal court habeas review.182
Lastly, Judge Lumpkin reasoned that consular notification assures that
defendants receive the benefit of due process. He concluded that, at most,
174. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
175. Torres, No. PCD-04-442, at 3-4 (Chapel, J., specially concurring).
176. Id. at 5 (Chapel, J., specially concurring).
177. Id. Judge Chapel notes that while Oklahoma must give full faith and credit to the
Avena decision, the ICJ does not have jurisdiction over the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals. Id.
178. Id. at 2 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 5 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting) (referring to 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089(D)(8)-(9) (2001)).
180. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089(D)(9). The Act indicates that decisions from the following
sources will be considered as authority to create a newly available legal claim: the U.S.
Supreme Court, a court of appeals of the United States, or a court of appellate jurisdiction of
Oklahoma. Id.
181. Torres, No. PCD-04-442, at 3 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 1 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting).
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Avena asked the court to review Torres’s case to ensure that he received the
benefit of being advised of consular rights, which he concluded was the
benefit of legal representation.183 Judge Lumpkin found no violation of due
process where competent counsel represented Torres and he was therefore
afforded all the rights that are guaranteed to U.S. citizens.184
IV. Analysis of Issues Raised by Torres185
Despite the lack of explanation within the actual order to stay Torres’s
execution, the court’s decision to follow Avena in providing “review and
reconsideration,” rather than its own declaration in Valdez that it was obliged
to follow Breard’s procedural default rule, implicitly resolved three major and
unsettled issues in Vienna Convention litigation in Torres’s favor. First, the
court’s decision indicates that the ICJ’s mandate of “review and
reconsideration” in Avena, without recourse to the procedural default rule, was
authoritative. Second, the court’s decision rests on the presumption that the
Vienna Convention is a self-executing treaty and — of great significance
because the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet articulated it — that it grants
individually enforceable rights. Third, in remanding the case for an
evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that a remedy is available for Vienna
Convention violations. These conclusions are significant and distinguish the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals from other U.S. courts concerning the
incorporation of international law — specifically the Vienna Convention —
into the domestic setting.
A. The Authority of ICJ Decisions Within U.S. State Courts
In Torres, the court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on
whether Torres was prejudiced by Oklahoma’s violation of his Vienna
Convention rights. In doing so, the court did not resort to the procedural
default rule as it had in Valdez. Under Oklahoma’s postconviction procedural
rules, all grounds for relief that are available to a defendant and not raised in
previous applications are deemed waived, except in certain limited

183. Id. at 3-4 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 4 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting).
185. The analysis in Part IV examines the legal significance of the Torres decision in the
context of the legal environment at the time the decision was announced, without regard to
developments in the United States’ treatment of the Vienna Convention occurring in and after
February 2005. Given these developments, however, the analysis also indicates where and how
the legal issues present in Torres will have continued relevance to future Vienna Convention
disputes. See infra Part V for a detailed discussion of developments in the Vienna Convention
legal environment occurring after Torres.
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circumstances.186 The procedural default rule is waivable only in instances
where, for example, the legal basis for the claim was previously unavailable
because it was not yet “recognized by or could not have been reasonably
formulated from” a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, a U.S. court of
appeals, or an Oklahoma court of appeals.187 In remanding the case, the court
therefore implicitly concluded that the ICJ’s Avena decision rose to the level
of a newly available “legal basis” that was authoritative to the degree of a
decision announced by the U.S. Supreme Court, a U.S. court of appeals, or an
Oklahoma court of appeals.188 Alternatively, the court may have determined,
according to Avena, that Oklahoma’s procedural rules could not be applied.
In either case, the Torres result suggests that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals found the ICJ’s opinion to be authoritative in Oklahoma.
The Torres result emerged in a legal context where the authority of the ICJ
over judicial proceedings was controversial and unsettled, particularly in state
courts, given the U.S. federalist system.189 The conflict between the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Torres about the authority of ICJ
opinions in U.S. domestic courts reflects this larger debate within the legal
community. One element of the debate is whether state courts should
immediately follow ICJ Vienna Convention decisions that appear to conflict
with the earlier U.S. Supreme Court Breard decision or wait until the Supreme
Court changes its ruling.190 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had
previously considered this question in the 2002 Valdez case,191 where it held
that the ICJ’s ruling in LaGrand against use of the procedural default rule did
not overrule the U.S. Supreme Court’s Breard ruling “until such time as the
supreme arbiter of the law of the United States changes its ruling.”192 In light
of the result in Torres, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals now
apparently considers itself able to waive the procedural default rule without
a change in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The conflict over whether states are bound by ICJ measures and decisions
involves two other elements: (1) whether state officials have discretion in
applying ICJ decisions and (2) whether the federal government has the
authority to compel states to follow international treaty obligations in state

186. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089(D)(2) (2001).
187. Id. § 1089(D)(9)(a).
188. Id. § 1089(D)(9).
189. See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist
Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1999).
190. Brown, supra note 20, at 315.
191. Valdez v. State, 2002 OK CR 20, ¶ 18, 46 P.3d 703, 708.
192. Id. ¶ 22, 46 P.3d at 709.
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criminal proceedings.193 In Torres, the Oklahoma judiciary, governor, and
pardon and parole board all appear to have taken the ICJ’s decision into
account and followed it as though it were authoritative. This contrasts with
other state officials’ responses in Vienna Convention disputes. For example,
Texas officials have explicitly denied any ICJ authority over Texas’s judicial
process.194 In response to the ICJ’s February 2003 provisional measure
ordering stays of execution for two Texas prisoners of Mexican nationality,
the governor’s office issued a statement that “[a]ccording to [the office of the
governor’s] reading of the law and the treaty, there is no authority for the
federal government or this World Court to prohibit Texas from exercising the
laws passed by our legislature.”195
Before Torres, the United States also argued that the federal government
cannot dictate what effect states must give to ICJ mandates in Vienna
Convention litigation.196 For example, in briefs for the Breard litigation
before the U.S. Supreme Court and the ICJ, the United States asserted that, “in
attempting to compel state compliance with international obligations, ‘[t]he
measures at [the United States’s] disposal’ under our Constitution may in
some instances include only persuasion.”197 Under this position, the United
States left the decision to follow the ICJ’s provisional measure in Breard to
the discretion of the Virginia governor, who declined to do so.198
The assertion that states may exercise discretion in following ICJ orders has
been both criticized and defended by legal scholars. The result in Breard
prompted much scholarly analysis. One commentator opines that the domestic
framework arising out of the Breard and LaGrand litigation “inexorably leads
to the untenable proposition that U.S. states are free to violate federal treaty
obligations with impunity.”199 Pointing to the deference given to the state of
193. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance
with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 683 (1998). This latter question
takes on new significance since President Bush’s memorandum to the U.S. Attorney General
indicating that states will carry out Avena’s mandate in future proceedings involving the fiftyone Mexican nationals named in Avena. See Memorandum for the Attorney General, supra note
31.
194. C. Bryson Hull, Defiant Texas Will Ignore World Court’s Death-Penalty Ruling, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 7, 2003, at A18.
195. Id. (quoting Gene Acuna, spokesman for Texas Governor Rick Perry).
196. Too Sovereign but Not Sovereign Enough, supra note 23, at 2655.
197. Id. (quoting Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Republic of Paraguay v.
Gilmore and Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (Nos. 97-1390, 97-8214), at 51 (internally
quoting Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 258, ¶ 41
(Provisional Measures Order of Apr. 9, 1998))).
198. Vázquez, supra note 193, at 684.
199. Too Sovereign but Not Sovereign Enough, supra note 23, at 2655.
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Virginia in Breard,200 this commentator characterizes the legal landscape
concerning Vienna Convention violations as one where domestic states are
“too sovereign” to be held accountable by the federal government for Vienna
Convention violations, but “not sovereign enough” to be held accountable in
the international context.201
Other scholars are also critical of U.S. federal and state positions regarding
the ICJ’s provisional measure staying Angel Breard’s execution. For
example, Professor Henkin argues that under Article 41 of the ICJ Statute and
the U.S. Constitution, the order had the same status as a self-executing U.S.
treaty obligation and is therefore “law for all who exercise authority in, or on
behalf of, the United States.”202 Similarly, Professor Vázquez argues that,
even if the ICJ provisional measure concerning Angel Breard was not binding,
as was not clear until the ICJ declared so in LaGrand, the Constitution does
not leave the decision of whether to comply with ICJ orders to state
governors.203 At a minimum, in the absence of a federal court ruling
compelling state compliance, Professor Vázquez argues that the President can
issue an executive order of compliance by virtue of the authority delegated to
him by treaties and the foreign affairs power.204 Professor Quigley also argues
that principles of federalism do not require the U.S. federal government to
defer to state governors in execution matters; to the contrary, he suggests that
the U.S. attorney general may sue state governments to enforce compliance
with U.S. treaty obligations.205
In contrast, Professor Bradley writes that these arguments depart from the
traditional “dualist” approach to international law in the United States206 and
reflect a presumption on the part of international legal scholars that
international law and ICJ decisions should be automatically incorporated into,
and take precedence over, domestic law.207 Furthermore, Professor Bradley
notes that these arguments elevate foreign affairs above countervailing
200. In that case, the U.S. State Department asserted that it only had the power of persuasion
over the state governor and the U.S. Supreme Court found the state immune from suit by
Paraguay. Id.
201. Id. at 2664.
202. Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations, and the States, 92 AM.
J. INT’L L. 679, 680 (1998).
203. Vázquez, supra note 193, at 690-91.
204. Id. at 691.
205. Quigley, supra note 19, at 440.
206. Bradley, supra note 189, at 530-31. “[T]he dualist view is that international and
domestic law are distinct, each nation determines for itself when and to what extent
international law is incorporated into its legal system, and the status of international law in the
domestic system is determined by domestic law.” Id. at 530.
207. Id. at 561.
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domestic considerations such as a U.S. state’s interest in controlling its
criminal justice system, the court system’s interest in the timely presentation
of claims, and the danger of ceding judicial authority over domestic matters
to a judiciary that does not necessarily represent U.S. interests.208 Professor
Bradley suggests that, in light of the sharp divergence of opinion generated by
the Breard litigation between scholars and federal and state officials, scholars
have “unrealistic expectations” in assuming that U.S. courts should treat an
ICJ order as self-executing federal law.209
Given the Court of Criminal Appeals’s decision in Torres, the court appears
to have concluded that the ICJ’s decision in Avena has authority in state court
proceedings. Although President Bush’s memorandum indicating that the
states will “give effect” to Avena may decrease the level of judicial discussion
on this front, a new set of federalism issues seem likely to arise in future
Vienna Convention proceedings. The clash in Professors Henkin, Quigley,
Vázquez, and Bradley’s views will likely be explored by legal scholars and
played out in state and federal courts considering the validity of President
Bush’s memorandum indicating that states will comply with the ICJ’s Avena
decision.210
B. Self-Execution and Individual Rights Under the Vienna Convention
A second issue that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals confronted
in considering Torres’s claim was the extent to which the Vienna Convention,
as an international treaty, operates on a domestic level to give domestic
officials duties and foreign detainees the right to enforce those duties in U.S.
courts. In granting Torres relief under his Vienna Convention claim, the court
found that the Vienna Convention operated domestically both to give
Oklahoma state officials a duty to carry out Vienna Convention obligations
and to provide Torres with an individual right to enforce those duties through
a legally recognized claim.
International treaties to which the United States is party are incorporated
into domestic law as “the supreme Law of the Land” and supersede conflicting
state law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.211
International treaties the United States enters into may even supersede state
208. Id.
209. Id. at 565-66.
210. Frederic L. Kirgis, ASIL Insight: President Bush’s Determination Regarding Mexican
Nationals and Consular Convention Rights (Mar. 2005) at http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/
03/insights050309.html [hereinafter Kirgis, ASIL Insight] (noting that there may be a
separation-of-powers issue regarding whether the President has the authority to determine the
legal effect of ICJ judgments on domestic proceedings).
211. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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authority and allow Congress to legislate over matters traditionally reserved
to the states under the Tenth Amendment.212 Under the U.S. “dualist”
approach to international law, however, while the United States is bound on
an international level to other party states by treaty obligations, the binding
nature of a treaty on a domestic level is determined by domestic law.213
Domestic courts analyze the domestic effect of treaties under the principle of
self-execution.214 Unless a treaty is self-executing, requiring no implementing
legislation by Congress, or unless Congress enacts implementing legislation,
an international treaty does not create binding obligations on a domestic level
and is not enforceable in U.S. domestic courts.215 Accordingly, if no
implementing legislation exists, treaties become the “supreme Law of the
Land” only when they are self-executing. The United States has enacted no
implementing legislation directly incorporating the Vienna Convention.
Therefore, whether the Vienna Convention creates duties that are enforceable
in U.S. courts turns on whether it is a self-executing treaty.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit described the issue of selfexecution as “one of the most confounding in treaty law.”216 Courts have
struggled to determine whether a treaty is self-executing or requires
implementing legislation in order to have domestic effect.217 Amplifying this
confusion, the principle of self-execution has two component parts that courts
often conflate, leading to the erroneous conclusion that all treaties deemed
non-self-executing have no domestic application whatsoever.218 In analyzing
the question of self-execution, it is important to separate whether a treaty (1)
operates domestically as law, thus giving individuals a duty to perform or
abstain from certain conduct, and (2) gives an individual a right, or standing,
to judicially enforce those duties if they are breached.219 Professor Sloss has
conveniently distinguished these two concepts as “primary law” and “remedial
law,” respectively.220 Judicial decisions refer to the latter concept as
212. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
213. Bradley, supra note 189, at 530; see supra note 206 for a definition of the dualist view.
214. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
215. Aceves, supra note 18, at 291; Bradley, supra note 189, at 539-40.
216. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979).
217. Id.; see, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties,
89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995) (discussing four distinct doctrines used by courts to determine
self-execution, and noting that confusion results from a tendency to view those separate
doctrines as only one).
218. David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2002).
219. Id.
220. Id. In European Union law these two distinct concepts are phrased, respectively, as
“direct applicability” and “direct effect.” J.A. Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect:
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“individual rights” or “individually enforceable rights.”221 Because the term
“self-executing” as used in U.S. jurisprudence is vague, sometimes referring
to either proposition, self-execution has been entirely negated on the basis of
either factor. While the conclusion that a treaty does not grant an individual
right of enforcement if it does not create a legal duty is logical, the reverse
conclusion is erroneous.222 For example, where a court finds that no remedy
exists for a treaty violation, the court may declare the treaty non-selfexecuting and thus negate the principle that the treaty imposes duties.223
Those legal duties, however, may still exist regardless of whether they carry
a judicial remedy.224 Consequently, these two concepts must be “unpacked”
in analyzing the Vienna Convention.
Domestic judicial interpretation resolves the question of self-execution
under an intent analysis.225 Because U.S. courts consider international treaties
to be contracts between nations, intent is determined under a process akin to
that used in contract interpretation.226 To determine intent, U.S. courts analyze
the express language of the treaty and other factors, such as “the way in which
the treaty obligations are phrased, the purposes and subject matter of the
treaty, and the treaty’s drafting history.”227 Additionally, courts may consider
statements made by the President, the Senate, and Congress when considering
the treaty for ratification.228 Under an intent analysis, legal scholars generally
conclude that the Vienna convention is a self-executing treaty.229 One key
piece of evidence supporting such a conclusion is that, in hearings before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, J. Edward Lyerly, State Department
Deputy Legal Adviser for the Nixon Administration, said that the treaty was
“‘entirely self-executive . . . and does not require any implementing or
Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community Law, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 425, 425-26
(1972).
221. See infra Part IV.B.
222. Sloss, supra note 218, at 11.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 10.
225. Aceves, supra note 18, at 292; Bradley, supra note 189, at 540-41. Bradley notes that
according to section 111, comment h of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, it is only the intent of the United States, rather than that of all parties, that
is considered, but that courts usually phrase this one-party analysis in terms of the parties’
intent. Bradley, supra note 189, at 540 n.57. For a critique of the use of intent analysis in the
domestic determination of whether treaties are self-executing, see Sloss, supra note 218, at 6.
226. Bradley, supra note 189, at 540.
227. Id. at 541. But see Sloss, supra note 218, at 6; Vázquez, supra note 217, at 695
(describing four distinct intent doctrines under which such factors may be analyzed).
228. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111
cmt. h (1987).
229. Aceves, supra note 18, at 268.
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complementing legislation.’”230 Lyerly further stated that the Vienna
Convention would govern “‘[t]o the extent there are conflicts in Federal
legislation or State laws.’”231 These statements, however, while supporting the
general proposition that the Vienna Convention creates a domestic legal duty,
do not indicate whether the Vienna Convention also grants an individual right
to enforce those obligations.
To date, the U.S. judiciary has given no definitive answer on whether the
Vienna Convention grants individual rights. The U.S. Supreme Court, in
deciding Breard, wrote that the Vienna Convention “arguably confers on an
individual the right to consular assistance,”232 but avoided deciding the case
on this issue and instead dismissed the case as procedurally barred under the
“later-in-time” doctrine.233 Even the Supreme Court’s most recent discussion
of the Vienna Convention in Medellín v. Dretke,234 where it dismissed as
improvidently granted a writ granted to a Mexican national named in Avena,
did not resolve the question of whether the Vienna Convention grants
individual rights; the Court simply noted it as one of many hurdles that the
claimant would have to overcome to obtain state or federal habeas relief.235
Furthermore, President Bush’s memorandum ordering states to comply with
Avena does not render the individual rights question moot. While states must
now presumably provide “review and reconsideration” as mandated by Avena,
the memorandum does not conclusively determine that the Vienna Convention
grants individual rights, and state courts could still potentially deny relief on
this ground.236
Without clarification from the U.S. Supreme Court, lower courts diverge
on whether the Vienna Convention grants individual rights. Some courts
dismiss claims on these grounds, claiming there is no private right of action,237
while others expressly affirm the right.238 Still others, following the U.S.
230. Id. (quoting S. Exec. Rep. No. 91-9, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 & 5 (appendix) (statement
by State Department Deputy Legal Adviser J. Edward Lyerly) (1969)).
231. Id.; see, e.g., Aceves, supra note 18, at 267-69 (outlining the history of U.S. Vienna
Convention ratification proceedings).
232. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (per curiam).
233. Id. at 376-77.
234. 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005).
235. Id. at 2091.
236. See Kirgis, ASIL Insight, supra note 210.
237. See United States v. De La Pava, 268, F.3d 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Li, 206 F.3d 56, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2000); Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1274
(E.D. Va. 1996); State v. Navarro, 659 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003); Kasi v.
Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 57, 64 (Va. 1998).
238. See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring); United
States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Standt v. City of
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Supreme Court’s lead in Breard, presume standing and hear the claim, but
dispose of it on other grounds, such as lack of prejudice or lack of remedy,
without articulating whether the Vienna Convention grants individual rights.239
Under an intent analysis, U.S. State Department opinions and actions
provide the basis to either support or reject the proposition that the Vienna
Convention grants individual rights. When adopting a defensive posture
before the ICJ, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and U.S. courts,
the U.S. State Department has repeatedly claimed that the Vienna Convention
does not create an individual right of action.240 This statement has been
influential for some courts considering the issue.241 The State Department’s
defensive stance, however, clearly contradicts its nonlitigation position, where
the State Department has worked with local officials to promote awareness of
Vienna Convention obligations and to ensure compliance.242 The State
Department issues periodic notices advising state officials of obligations under
the Vienna Convention and, since the Breard decision, has begun to conduct
briefings with state officials and has produced pocket-sized reference cards for
police officers.243 The apparent conflict between the State Department’s
defensive position and these pro-active efforts may simply be attributed to the
fact that the State Department considers the Vienna Convention to create
obligations, but not to create an individual right to enforce those obligations.
Beyond these efforts to achieve prospective compliance on the part of state
officials, however, the State Department has contacted state governors to
request “review and reconsideration” of death penalty sentences in light of
Vienna Convention breaches.244 Furthermore, when the United States invoked
New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara,
37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1125 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
239. See United States v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226
F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2000); Valdez v. State, 2002 OK CR 20, ¶¶ 23-24, 46 P.3d 703, 709-10.
240. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that the U.S. State
Department denied an individual right of action in response to certified questions from that
court, in testimony before the ICJ in Paraguay v. United States, and in a written advisory
opinion to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights).
241. Id. at 63; State v. Navarro, 659 N.W.2d 487, 492 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
242. Ray, supra note 15, at 1738.
243. Aceves, supra note 18, at 323-24.
244. See Gov. Henry Press Release, supra note 30 (indicating that the U.S. State Department
had asked the Oklahoma governor to give “careful consideration” to the fact that the U.S. is
party to the Vienna Convention when considering Torres’s request for clemency); Sean D.
Murphy, ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 96 AM.
J. INT’L L. 461, 462 (2002) (reprinting letter to Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating from
William H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser for the U.S. Department of State, requesting Governor
Keating to “specially consider” whether the violation of Gerardo Valdez’s Vienna Convention
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the Vienna Convention to vindicate its own rights before the ICJ against Iran
during the Tehran Hostage Crisis, the United States argued that the Vienna
Convention provided individual rights.245 These State Department efforts to
redress Vienna Convention violations directly support the notion that the
Vienna Convention grants individual rights.
On a global level, international courts have held that the Vienna
Convention grants individual rights. In LaGrand, the ICJ held that Article 36,
paragraph 1 creates individual rights.246 One U.S. federal court found this
interpretation to be binding because the United States had voluntarily
consented to ICJ jurisdiction over the interpretation of the Vienna
Convention.247 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued a
nonbinding advisory opinion that Article 36 confers individual legal rights and
furthermore, that denial of those rights was a denial of due process
guarantees.248 That court discerned an individual right from the plain text of
the Vienna Convention, as well as from the U.S. position on the Vienna
Convention before the ICJ in its case against Iran.249
Because U.S. cases before Torres have generally not provided relief for
breaches of the Vienna Convention, U.S. courts have easily avoided resolving
the question of individual standing. Given that the court in Torres provided
relief by staying Torres’s execution, however, the court must have considered
the Vienna Convention to both create legal obligations and grant an individual
right to enforce those obligations. Because the reasoning for this conclusion
is not articulated within the order, the court’s conclusion raises interesting
questions about what sources — domestic or international — the court found

rights caused prejudice); see also Brown, supra note 20, at 313-14 (noting that the U.S. State
Department routinely asks state officials to consider Vienna Convention violations during
clemency proceedings).
245. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 64
(May 24), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
246. LaGrand Case (F.G.R. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 77 (June 27), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org.
247. United States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(writing “the I.C.J. ruling conclusively determines that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
creates individually enforceable rights, resolving the question most American courts (including
the Seventh Circuit) have left open”).
248. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees
of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion No. OC-16/99, Inter-Am. C. H. R., Ser. A. No.
16 (1999), available at http://www.oas.org; see also Michael Fleishman, Reciprocity
Unmasked: The Role of the Mexican Government in Defense of Its Foreign Nationals in United
States Death Penalty Cases, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 359, 391-93 (2003) (providing an
overview of the Advisory Opinion and noting its nonbinding nature over the United States).
249. Fleishman, supra note 248, at 391.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005

284

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:255

to be authoritative concerning the principle that the Vienna Convention
provides individual rights.
C. Remedy Within U.S. Judicial Proceedings for Vienna Convention
Violations
The availability of a remedy for Vienna Convention violations clearly
relates to the principle of individual rights under the Vienna Convention.
Another way of phrasing the individual rights question is whether a judicial
remedy exists for the breach of a legal duty. Analyzing the ideas of individual
rights and availability of remedy separately is useful, however, because at
least one court has held that even if the Vienna Convention grants individual
rights, it provides no remedy.250 Furthermore, because the procedural default
rule and court rulings that the Vienna Convention provides no individual
rights have precluded many Vienna Convention claims, the appropriate
remedy for a Vienna Convention violation is a question largely unexplored by
the courts. In light of President Bush’s recent memorandum that state courts
will give effect to Avena’s mandate,251 more courts may have reason to
consider whether a remedy is available for Vienna Convention violations and,
if so, what that remedy might be.
In Torres, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals identified a remedy for
a Vienna Convention violation. On a general level, the court found that the
appropriate remedy was to stay Torres’s execution and remand the case to
determine whether the violation prejudiced his trial court proceedings.252 On
a more specific level, however, what remedy would be available if prejudice
was determined remains uncertain. Because Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry
granted clemency to Torres on the issue of execution and commuted Torres’s
sentence to life in prison, this hearing is now presumably unnecessary and a
judicial remedy in Oklahoma for Vienna Convention violations remains
unknown.253 Nevertheless, the court’s order indicating a general remedy,
which contemplates that a specific remedy would also be available, is
significant within the landscape of domestic Vienna Convention disputes.

250. United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 887 (8th Cir. 2002).
251. Memorandum for the Attorney General, supra note 31.
252. Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442, at 2 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (order granting
stay of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing).
253. Beyond challenging the execution sentence, it is possible that Torres could pursue a
hearing on the prejudice caused by the violation of his Vienna Convention rights for the purpose
of questioning his conviction or the commutation of his sentence to life in prison. Interview
with Randall T. Coyne, Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law, in Norman, Okla.
(Nov. 2004).
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The conclusion in Torres is arguably consistent with Breard, where the
Supreme Court suggested in dictum that a determination of prejudice was a
necessary predicate to providing a remedy for a Vienna Convention
violation.254 In Breard, the Court noted that, “[e]ven were Breard’s Vienna
Convention claim properly raised and proven, it is extremely doubtful that the
violation should result in the overturning of a final judgment of conviction
without some showing that the violation had an effect on the trial.”255 The
result in Torres is also consistent with Avena, where the ICJ required U.S.
courts to provide “review and reconsideration” that gives “full weight” to the
violation.256 While barring the use of the procedural default rule, Avena
deferred to U.S. courts the choice of “an appropriate remedy having the nature
of review and reconsideration.”257 The ICJ further explained the obligation of
review and reconsideration as “ascertaining whether in each case the violation
of Article 36 committed by the competent authorities caused actual prejudice
to the defendant in the process of administration of criminal justice.”258
Even where a court follows the Breard dictum and Avena’s mandate of
“review and reconsideration” and makes a determination of prejudice, the
appropriate remedy in the United States for a Vienna Convention violation
remains unclear.259 Some scholars argue that customary international law
provides the appropriate remedy for a Vienna Convention violation and that
under customary international law, the appropriate remedy for a treaty
violation is to restore the status quo ante.260 Under this approach, the
appropriate remedy for a Vienna Convention violation in criminal cases would
be to suppress evidence or grant a new trial.261 In Avena, Mexico requested
the ICJ to restore the status quo ante by annulling the convictions and
sentences of the Mexican nationals named in the suit and declaring any
evidence obtained in violation of the Vienna Convention excluded from any
future criminal proceedings.262 The ICJ expressly refused both proposals263
and instead opted for the modified “review and reconsideration”

254. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998) (per curiam).
255. Id.
256. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶ 139 (Mar. 31),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
257. Id. ¶ 152.
258. Id. ¶ 121 (emphasis added).
259. Id. ¶ 152.
260. Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Search
for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 565, 610 (1997).
261. Id.
262. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶ 121.
263. Id. ¶¶ 123-130.
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requirement.264 While the ICJ’s directive contemplates that a remedy would
be provided,265 Professor Aceves notes that this is essentially a remedy of
process rather than outcome.266 To meet the ICJ’s requirement, a U.S. court
must consider the Vienna Convention violation but need not come to any
particular conclusion as to the effect of the violation.267 In this way, the ICJ’s
requirement in Avena continues the practice of deference originally given to
the United States in LaGrand.268 Given that the ICJ did not dictate an actual
remedy for Vienna Convention violations, but rather dictated the process of
“review and reconsideration,” it is significant that the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals went as far as granting Torres a stay of execution and that
the Oklahoma Governor reached even farther by granting clemency.
In the United States, other courts have declined to grant a remedy for
Vienna Convention violations, reasoning that the Vienna Convention itself
does not require a remedy.269 Even where a court provides “review and
reconsideration,” an alternative reason for denying an additional remedy could
be that, “[b]ecause the individual right is to notification and access, not to
consular assistance, it is difficult to determine exactly what harm the treaty
violation has caused in any particular case.”270 This commentator concludes
that “[t]his has led many U.S. courts to deny such relief as suppression of
confessions, dismissal of indictments, and reversal of convictions.”271
In contrast, another commentator noted that the prejudice test as applied in
Vienna Convention cases “establishes a nearly insurmountable hurdle for
defendants.”272 This may be because courts tend to undermine the value of
consular assistance, conflating it with the assistance of competent counsel.273
264. Id. ¶ 131.
265. Id. (“[S]uch review and reconsideration has to be carried out ‘by taking account of the
violation of the rights set forth in the Convention’ . . . including, in particular, the question of
the legal consequences of the violation upon the criminal proceedings that have followed the
violation.”) (quoting LaGrand Case (F.G.R. v. U.S.), 2000 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 125 (June 27).
266. Bernard H. Oxman & William J. Aceves, International Decisions: LaGrand (Germany
v. United States) Judgment, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 210, 217 (2002).
267. Id.
268. See William J. Aceves, International Decisions: Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. United States) Provisional Measures Order, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 923, 928 (2003)
(discussing the “margin of appreciation” given to the United States in mandating “review and
reconsideration” but deferring to the United States’ choice of means).
269. United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 887 (8th Cir. 2002); Ray, supra note 15, at 1741.
270. Joan Fitzpatrick, Consular Rights and the Death Penalty After LaGrand, 96 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 309, 309 (2002).
271. Id.
272. Ray, supra note 15, at 1740.
273. John Quigley, Consular Rights and the Death Penalty after LaGrand, 96 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 315, 316 (2002).
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Accordingly, under this approach, where a foreign national has had access to
legal counsel, courts find no prejudice because they presume that counsel
provided any information or assistance that the consulate would have provided
to the detainee.274 Furthermore, prejudice may be difficult to prove if the
foreign national cannot show if or how the consul would have assisted him.275
Although prejudice may be difficult to establish under these requirements,
Mexican nationals may have the greatest success in establishing prejudice.
The Mexican government has been increasingly active in assisting its
nationals in U.S. capital proceedings, providing legal assistance and mitigating
evidence from Mexico.276 Thus, Mexican detainees may have better success
in establishing that their consulate would indeed intervene in their case, as
well as the sort of assistance Mexico would provide in their defense.
Even if a court finds prejudice, another issue in applying a remedy is the
status of the rights granted by the Vienna Convention. Some courts have held
that there is no remedy for a Vienna Convention violation because a treaty
violation does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and therefore
does not require the remedies appropriate for constitutional violations, such
as suppression of evidence.277 Although it did not reach the issue of remedy
in Medellín, the U.S. Supreme Court commented in its “advisory” and
“academic” considerations that a prisoner seeking federal relief on the basis
of a Vienna Convention claim must meet a number of constitutional threshold
issues for a federal court to hear an appeal.278 Until the U.S. Supreme Court
issues a binding decision on the status of Vienna Convention rights vis-à-vis
the Due Process clause, the availability of constitutional remedies remains
unknown. Alternatively, a state court could examine the Vienna Convention
under the state constitution’s due process clause and provide a more liberal
interpretation that would grant greater access to remedy.
V. The Future of Vienna Convention Claims in U.S. Courts
Since the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals issued the Torres order in
May 2004, the legal landscape concerning Vienna Convention disputes has
changed dramatically. First, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum
to the U.S. Attorney General on February 28, 2005 indicating that the United
States will comply with its Vienna Convention obligations by having state

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
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courts “give effect” to the ICJ’s decision in Avena.279 As a result, unless the
President’s authority to issue such a directive is challenged,280 it seems likely
that state courts will hear Vienna Convention claims from Mexican nationals
named in Avena without recourse to the procedural default rule.281 Although
President Bush’s memorandum initially signaled a level of U.S. deference to
international obligations,282 just a week later, the United States withdrew from
the Optional Protocol granting jurisdiction to the ICJ in disputes involving the
Vienna Convention.283 As a result, the Avena decision is apparently the last
international interpretation of U.S. obligations under the Vienna Convention
and henceforth, domestic courts alone will determine the effect of the treaty.284
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed as improvidently granted a writ
allowing an Avena-based Vienna Convention claim in order that the claimant
could pursue reconsideration of his sentence in state court pursuant to
President Bush’s memorandum.285 In doing so, the Court identified five
threshold issues that may preclude federal habeas relief for Vienna
Convention claimants, but indicated that the discussion of the issues was
“advisory or academic” and “not free from doubt.”286
While claimants in future Vienna Convention disputes in U.S. courts are
likely to rely on Torres, its strength in future legal claims remains to be seen.
Although Torres signifies that Oklahoma has directly incorporated
international law — specifically an ICJ decision and Vienna Convention
obligations — the Torres result likely faces serious obstacles in other
jurisdictions. President Bush’s memorandum indicates that state courts will
give effect to Avena’s mandate of “review and reconsideration.” The
memorandum does not,
however,
require anything beyond such
287
reconsideration.
Also, the same unresolved issues facing the Torres court
of self-execution, individual rights, and the availability of remedy for Vienna
Convention violations may produce divergent results across jurisdictions.288
279. Memorandum for the Attorney General, supra note 31.
280. See Kirgis, ASIL Insight, supra note 210.
281. Id.
282. See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005,
at A1.
283. Kirgis, Addendum, supra note 32.
284. But see id. (noting that the validity of withdrawal is uncertain because the Protocol is
silent on whether a state party may withdraw and questioning whether the President may
unilaterally withdraw from a Senate-ratified treaty without consent of the Senate).
285. Medellín v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2088 (2005) (per curiam).
286. Id. at 2090. The issues raised by the Court are beyond the scope of this article and will
not be discussed here.
287. Kirgis, ASIL Insight, supra note 210.
288. See supra Part IV.
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Unless the U.S. Supreme Court issues binding, definitive answers to those
questions, state courts will continue to resolve those issues independently.
Additional issues not present in Torres are also likely to emerge in future
Vienna Convention claims and may serve as barriers to relief. First, state
courts may defy President Bush’s memorandum and continue to apply the
“later-in-time” doctrine, thereby precluding hearings on the merits of Vienna
Convention violations. Second, even where a court follows President Bush’s
directive and provides “review and reconsideration” of a Vienna Convention
claim, the degree to which U.S. courts will apply Avena to non-Mexican
nationals or Mexican nationals who are not named in Avena is unknown.
Future courts considering Vienna Convention claims may find that the ICJ’s
judgment in Avena is not relevant on the basis of either of these grounds.
A. President Bush’s Memorandum and the “Later-in-Time” Doctrine in
State Court Proceedings
The effect of President Bush’s memorandum ordering state courts to follow
Avena’s mandate and provide review and reconsideration is uncertain.
Although scholars argue that the President may enforce compliance with
Vienna Convention obligations under the foreign policy powers granted by the
Constitution,289 this Constitutional authority will likely be tested. For
example, a spokesman for the Texas Attorney General’s office commented on
whether Texas would reopen state court proceedings for one of the Mexican
nationals named in Avena pursuant to the President’s memorandum, stating
“[w]e respectfully believe the executive determination exceeds the
constitutional bounds for federal authority.”290 Further, the spokesman
indicated that “[t]he State of Texas believes no international court supersedes
the laws of Texas or the laws of the United States.”291
Comments such as these indicate that, notwithstanding President Bush’s
memorandum, future claimants in state court may continue to confront the
“later-in-time” doctrine.292 In past Vienna Convention disputes, state courts
have deferred to Breard’s analysis of the “later-in-time” doctrine and have
289. Vázquez, supra note 193, at 690-91; but see Kirgis, ASIL Insight, supra note 210
(noting presidential authority under the foreign policy powers but also noting a separation-ofpowers issue in whether the president has the authority to determine the legal effect of ICJ
decisions within domestic proceedings).
290. Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn from World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 2005, at A16 (quoting Jerry Strickland, spokesman for Texas Attorney General Greg
Abbot).
291. Id.
292. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the “later-in-time”
doctrine.
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consequently ruled that their own procedural default rules supercede the
Vienna Convention.293 The resulting application of the procedural default
rule, however, is flawed when the “later-in-time” doctrine is applied in state
court proceedings. Breard held that a federal procedural rule enacted after the
Vienna Convention superseded the Vienna Convention under the “later-intime” doctrine.294 Under this reasoning, however, a state court should not be
able to invoke the “later-in-time” doctrine. Under the Supremacy Clause, a
treaty, which has the legal status of a federal statute, should supersede a
state’s own procedural rule. Therefore, a state should not be able to supersede
the Vienna Convention with its own procedural rules.
B. Future Claimants Entitled to Invoke Avena
Even where a state court follows President Bush’s directive and hears a
Vienna Convention claim, several issues may limit the application of Avena
to future claimants. First, President Bush’s memorandum appears to limit the
class of individuals to whom “review and reconsideration” applies. The
memorandum indicates that states will give effect to Avena “in cases filed by
the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.”295 As a result, whether
claimants of other nationalities, or Mexican nationals not named in Avena, can
use the memorandum as an authority for waiving the procedural default rule
is uncertain.
Second, even under a more liberal application of President Bush’s
memorandum to claimants not named in Avena, the binding nature of Avena
itself is limited. Under Article 59 of the ICJ Statute, decisions of the ICJ are
only binding on the actual parties and the particular case before the court.296
Article 59 rejects the concept of stare decisis.297 Accordingly, the holding in
Avena clearly speaks to U.S. criminal proceedings involving the fifty-one
Mexican nationals named in the decision. In contrast, the binding nature of
Avena on any future claims made by non-Mexican foreign nationals, or even
other Mexican nationals, is questionable.
An interesting complication is that, in announcing its decision in Avena, the
ICJ held that its decision concerned the general application of the Vienna
Convention and was not limited to the named Mexican nationals. The court
wrote that “the fact that in this case the Court’s ruling has concerned only
Mexican nationals cannot be taken to imply that the conclusions reached by
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

See Valdez v. State, 2002 OK CR 20, ¶ 22, 46 P.3d 703, 709.
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam).
Memorandum for the Attorney General, supra note 31.
ICJ Statute, supra note 57, art. 59.
SHABTAI ROSENNE, PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 193 (1983) [hereinafter
ROSENNE, PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT].
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it in the present Judgment do not apply to other foreign nationals finding
themselves in similar situations.”298 The ICJ’s intent by this statement is
unclear, allowing several possible interpretations. The court’s statement may
simply indicate that the court intended to decide future cases in a fashion
similar to Avena. Thus, the statement may have been made to avoid future
litigation over the same issues by the same or different parties. Alternatively,
the court may have considered its interpretation of a treaty to have continuing
effect where the treaty remains in force.299 Finally, the court may have
intended the judgment to apply to all states that are party to the Vienna
Convention.
If the latter proposition is true, the court’s attempt to modify the authority
of its own decisions is likely to face criticism. When the ICJ earlier declared
its own provisional measures binding, commentators found the decision
surprising and controversial.300 In that instance, however, the article in the ICJ
Statute concerning provisional measures was ambiguous.301 The court
interpreted the ambiguous language in the ICJ Statute’s article granting the
court the authority to issue provisional measures in light of the purpose of the
ICJ and concluded that its provisional measures were binding.302 In contrast,
the article in the ICJ Statute concerning the binding nature of the court’s
decisions is explicit. Where the ICJ Statute is explicit, “the Court has no
discretionary power to disregard the specific provisions of the Statute, even
where this might be desirable from the point of view of the abstract
administration of justice.”303
Thus, U.S. courts considering future claims made by foreign nationals not
named in Avena are probably not legally bound to the ICJ’s mandate of
“review and reconsideration” without resort to procedural bar. With the ICJ’s
statement regarding the general applicability of Avena in mind, however, U.S.
298. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶ 151 (Mar. 31),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
299. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 62021 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter ROSENNE, LAW AND PRACTICE].
300. Bruno Simma, Consular Rights and the Death Penalty After LaGrand, 96 AM . SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 310, 310 (2002); Oxman & Aceves, supra note 266, at 217.
301. Oxman & Aceves, supra note 266, at 217.
302. Quigley, supra note 19, at 438-39. In making its decision, the ICJ compared the
English and French versions of Article 41 in the ICJ Statute. The English version indicates that
states “ought” to follow provisional measures, whereas the French version uses the word
“devoir,” which conveys a sense of duty. The court resolved the discrepancy by looking at the
object and purpose of the ICJ Statute, which is to issue final and binding judgments. The court
concluded that only binding provisional measures would enable the court to meet its primary
purpose. Id.
303. ROSENNE, PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 297, at 50.
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courts may be persuaded to apply Avena’s holding to all foreign nationals with
Vienna Convention claims to promote uniformity of results and reduce further
international conflict on the topic. Because the United States has now
withdrawn from the Optional Protocol, such conflict will likely be confined
to the diplomatic arena. Lastly, U.S. courts may be reluctant to treat foreign
detainees differently, solely on the basis of nationality.304
VI. Conclusion
Since 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court and the ICJ have issued conflicting
rulings regarding the obligations of U.S. domestic courts when considering
Vienna Convention claims. In Torres, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals declined to follow its own decision in Valdez and the Supreme
Court’s holding in Breard, and instead issued an unprecedented order that
incorporated Vienna Convention obligations and ICJ authority into Oklahoma
law. In doing so, the court resolved three major issues that often preclude the
incorporation of international law into the domestic setting. In staying
Torres’s execution, the court implicitly found that: (1) despite issues of
federalism, the ICJ’s authority extends to criminal proceedings in Oklahoma;
(2) the Vienna Convention creates domestic duties and grants an individual
right to enforce those duties; and (3) a remedy is available for Vienna
Convention violations.
The impact of Torres on future court decisions remains to be seen, but other
state and federal courts will confront these and other complex issues in
considering Vienna Convention claims. President Bush’s memorandum
ordering states to give effect to Avena likely guarantees that courts will begin
addressing these issues sooner rather than later. In state courts, a key issue
will be whether those courts are required to follow President Bush’s
memorandum and, by extension, Avena’s command of “review and
reconsideration.” A state court that holds that President Bush’s memorandum
exceeds his constitutional authority could then decline to give effect to Avena
on the basis that, under principles of federalism, states are not bound by ICJ
decisions. This issue remains discretionary until the Supreme Court revisits
Breard and comments on the binding force of ICJ decisions. Scholars have
noted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence preserving Tenth
Amendment rights of the states may influence a decision in favor of state
sovereignty.305 On the other hand, the Court wrote in Breard that “we should
304. See Quigley, supra note 19, at 438.
305. Vázquez, supra note 193, at 687-88; Too Sovereign but Not Sovereign Enough, supra
note 23, at 2658-59; see Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. “States’
Rights” in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1279 (1999) (considering the possible
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give respectful consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty
rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret such.”306 If the
Court were to affirm state sovereignty regarding Vienna Convention
obligations and ICJ decisions, then individual states could choose for
themselves what effect to give to ICJ decisions. In this event, while the result
in Torres may be persuasive in some jurisdictions, divergence across
jurisdictions will most likely continue.307
If the “later-in-time” and federalism hurdles are overcome and a claim is
heard on its merits, state and federal courts will then grapple with the issue of
whether the Vienna Convention grants an individual right to enforce Vienna
Convention obligations. Finally, if a foreign national is found to have
standing to enforce a claim, courts will then need to determine the appropriate
remedy, if any, for a Vienna Convention violation. Courts may look to Torres
for guidance, but until the U.S. Supreme Court issues a binding decision
resolving these issues, the results of Vienna Convention claims will likely
continue to vary by jurisdiction.
Heather L. Finstuen

application of the Supreme Court’s rule against federal “commandeering” of state officials in
the context of foreign affairs).
306. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam).
307. See supra Part IV.A.
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